Ah, now I see where you're coming from. Steven Horwitz writes on two blogs that I read...
Fuck it, why don't I just debunk the whole damn piece?
Firstly, economics is all about conducting experiments. In macroeconomics creating laboratory conditions is extremely difficult, but in some cases it is possible (like when
comparing Jamaica and Barbados), and in others we settle for the next best thing: comparing and analyzing all types of empirical evidence.
Secondly, macroeconomic debates
are settled based on facts: the models and ways of thinking that give us useful information and useful predictions are kept, and those that do not are discarded. This is of course a long and dirty process, and those who want to nitpick about some element of it can readily do so.
Thirdly, the Austrian business cycle model -- the one Steven bases most of his writings on -- was discarded for this very reason somewhere around the 1920s. Today, only a very small group of people (mostly outside of academia) continue to be interested in talking about it.
Here is a
link to a thread from last year where I went through several ways in which uneducated people who follow these people tend to be misguided.
Yes, the crisis was worse than everyone expected. Let's not pretend that if the prediction in that graph had held up, it would've changed Steven's worldview. Why? Because his worldview (or at least one formulation of it, which he pulls out whenever it's convenient) is explicit about
rejecting the use of empirical evidence altogether (in other words it conveniently shuns every attempt to reject it based on empirical evidence, even though 99.9999% of educated people consider this type of falsifiability an important criterion for a theory to be considered scientific).
After this paragraph he starts making wild assertions about the effects of various events and policies during the Great Depression, based on the aforementioned theory that was discarded in the 1920s.
Considering the level of understanding I invented that has demonstrated throughout our discussion, I don't think he will benefit much from a technical point-to-point rebuttal. Therefore, I'll just cut to the chase:
The crux of Horwitz's argument is this thing called "malinvestment".
Firstly, while this concept is central to everything he talks about, he refuses to define it in any way that would allow us to measure it, or to make predictions about how much of it might occur under different types of policy regimes.
(This is of course problematic for all kinds of reasons, which you can surely imagine.)
Secondly, behind a veil of fancy-sounding technobabble, he is making a very simple assertion: Fed and government action produce these "malinvestments", and that's the end of the story.
(Nothing we can do about it, except get rid of the Fed and the government.)
Here's an example from his article:
As you can see, he's just asserting this stuff. No proof, no evidence. Just the implications of a few simplistic theories from a hundred years ago.
And all this happens inevitably. Unquantifiably, but inevitably.
What does a malinvestment look like? No one really knows.
But easy money supposedly creates it...
This of course raises a myriad of questions -- none of which Horwitz can answer properly.
Would Amazon (a company created under easy money) have been considered a malinvestment if tight money had caused its investors to pull out before it became profitable? Presumably.
But wait a minute -- that means 1) tight money would have been the culprit, and 2) there was a way for Amazon to avoid becoming a malinvestment. In other words, it was not inevitable!
Maybe the economy's a bit too complex for us to be basing our analyses on the simplistic and fatalistic assumption that "malinvestments just happen"? Especially when we are not allowed to measure their scale or scope.

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